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Abstract In a recent paper published in Social Choice and Welfare (27 (2006)
327-339), Banerjee characterized extensions of the Suppes-Sen grading principle
and the Basu-Mitra utilitarian relation de¯ned on in¯nite utility streams with
the axiom ofQ-Anonymity and discussed the relative merits of the extended util-
itarian relation. On the other hand, Asheim and Tungodden (Economic Theory
24: 221-230, 2004) used conditions of Preference Continuity to characterize lex-
imin and utilitarianism. We characterize extensions of the Asheim-Tungodden
leximin and utilitarian relations with Q-Anonymity, compare the rankings by
the extended overtaking criteria with those by the extended simpli¯ed criteria
and discuss their relative merits.
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Utilitarianism; Simpli¯ed criterion
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Banerjee (2006) characterized extensions of the Suppes-Sen
grading principle and the Basu-Mitra utilitarian relation de¯ned on in¯nite util-
ity streams with Q-Anonymity and argued that the rankings by the extended
utilitarian relation are far more acceptable than those by the catching up rela-
tion1 or the Basu-Mitra utilitarian relation.
On the one hand, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) used Preference Continu-
ity to characterize leximin and utilitarianism. The Asheim-Tungodden leximin
relation is more complete than a leximin relation characterized by Bossert et al.
(2007) and so is the Asheim-Tungodden utilitarian relation than the Basu-Mitra
utilitarian relation, that is, an overtaking criterion is more complete than the
corresponding simpli¯ed criterion.
We characterize extensions of the Asheim-Tungodden leximin and utilitar-
ian relations with Q-Anonymity and argue that the rankings by the extended
¤Very preliminary. Please do not quote without the authors' permission.
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mail: k-kmg@ruri.waseda.jp)
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1Banerjee (2006) referred to this relation as the overtaking relation.
1
overtaking criteria are more complete than those by the extended simpli¯ed
criteria.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the ba-
sic de¯nitions. Section 3 discusses the incompatibleness of Q-Anonymity and
Strong Preference Continuity. In Section 4, we consider the compatibility of
Q-Anonymity and Weak Preferecne Continuity. Section 5 discusses the relative
merits of the extended overtaking criteria and concludes the analysis.
2 Basic de¯nitions
Let R denote the set of all real numbers and N the set of all natural numbers.
Let X = RN be the domain of in¯nite utility streams. A typical element of X is
an in¯nite-dimensional vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ). For all x 2 X and all n 2 N, we
denote (x1; : : : ; xn) by x¡n and (xn+1; xn+2; : : : ) by x+n. Thus for all x 2 X
and all n 2 N, we can write x = (x¡n; x+n).
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a binary relation % on X which is re°exive
and transitive (a quasi-ordering). We write, as usual, x Â y if x % y holds but
y % x does not and x » y if x % y and y % x both hold. A SWR %A is a
subrelation to a SWR %B if (a) x ÂA y ) x ÂB y and (b) x »A y ) x »B y.
We write %A´%B if two SWRs %A and %B are subrelations to each other.
A permutation is a bijection on N. We denote the set of all permutations by
P. A ¯nite permutation is a permutation ¼ such that there exists ¹n 2 N with
¼(n) = n for all n > ¹n. The set of all ¯nite permutations is denoted by F .
We are concerned with ¯xed step permutations. LetQ = f¼ 2 P : there exists k 2
N such that for all n 2 N, ¼(f1; : : : ; nkg) = f1; : : : ; nkgg. For all x 2 X and all
¼ 2 P, we denote (x¼(1); x¼(2); : : : ) by ¼^(x).
Negation of a statement is indicated by the logical quanti¯er :. For all
x; y 2 X, we write x > y if for all i 2 N, xi ¸ yi and x > y if x > y and x 6= y.
The following two axioms are imposed on the SWRs.
Strong Pareto For all x; y 2 X, if x > y, then x Â y.
Q-Anonymity For all x 2 X and all ¼ 2 Q, ¼^(x) » x.
3 Impossibility
In this section, we discuss the incompatibleness of Q-Anonymity and Strong
Preference Continuity.
Strong preference continuity For all x; y 2 X, if (a) there exists ¹n 2 N
such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; y+n) % y and (b) for all ¹n 2 N, there
exists an integer n ¸ ¹n such that (x¡n; y+n) Â y, then x Â y.
3.1 Propositions
Proposition 1 There exists no SWR % satisfying Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity
and Strong Preference Continuity.
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Proof Suppose not. Assume that % satis¯es Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity and
Strong Preference Continuity. Let x = (1; 0; 1; 0; : : : ) and y = (0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ). Q-
Anonymity of% implies that for all n 2 N, (x¡2n; y+2n) » y and (x¡(2n¡1); y+(2n¡1)) »
(x1; y+1). Since % satis¯es Strong Pareto, (x1; y+1) Â y. Transitivity of %
implies that for all n 2 N, (x¡(2n¡1); y+(2n¡1)) Â y. By Strong Preference Con-
tinuity of %, we have x Â y, which contradicts x » y implied by Q-Anonymity
of %.
Basu and Mitra (2007) used the axiom of Strong Consistency in their char-
acterization of the catching up SWR. Denoting (0; 0; : : : ) by o, this axiom is
stated as follows:
Strong consistency For all x; y 2 X
(a) If there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; o) % (y¡n; o),
then x % y
(b) If (i) there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; o) %
(y¡n; o) and (ii) for all ¹n 2 N, there exists an integer n ¸ ¹n such that
(x¡n; o) Â (y¡n; o), then x Â y.
We can also show the incompatibleness of Q-Anonymity and Strong Consis-
tency.
Proposition 2 There exists no SWR % satisfying Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity
and Strong Consisteny.
Proof Suppose not. Assume that % satis¯es Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity
and Strong Consistency. Let x = (1; 0; 1; 0; : : : ) and y = (0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ). Q-
Anonymity of% implies that for all n 2 N, (x¡2n; o) » (y¡2n; o) and (x¡(2n¡1); o) »
(y¡(2n+1); o). Since % satis¯es Strong Pareto, for all n 2 N, (x¡(2n+1); o) Â
(x¡(2n¡1); o). Transitivity of % implies that for all n 2 N, (x¡(2n+1); o) »
(y¡(2n+1); o). By Strong Consistency of %, we have x Â y, which contradicts
x » y implied by Q-Anonymity of %.
3.2 Examples
Consider the following two SWRs characterized by Asheim and Tungodden
(2004).
Example 1 Consider a leximin relation called the S-leximin relation. We ¯rst
introduce the usual leximin ordering on Rn. For all x 2 X and all n 2 N,
let (x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(n)) denote a non-decreasing permutation of x
¡n, that is, x¡n(1) ·
¢ ¢ ¢ · x¡n(n), ties being broken arbitrarily. Then we can de¯ne the usual leximin
ordering on Rn as follows: For all x¡n; y¡n 2 Rn
x¡n %nL y¡n holds if and only if (x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(n)) = (y
¡n
(1) ; : : : ; y
¡n
(n)) or there
exists an integer k < n such that (x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(k)) = (y
¡n
(1) ; : : : ; y
¡n
(k) ) and
x¡n(k+1) > y
¡n
(k+1).
3
Using %nL, we can de¯ne S-Leximin as follows: For all x; y 2 X
x %Ls y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,
(x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(n)) = (y
¡n
(1) ; : : : ; y
¡n
(n)) or there exists a positive integer k < n such
that (x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(k)) = (y
¡n
(1) ; : : : ; y
¡n
(k) ) and x
¡n
(k+1) > y
¡n
(k+1).
Let x = (1; 0; 1; 0; : : : ) and y = (0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ). Then we have x ÂLs y, which
contradicts x » y implied by Q-Anonymity.
Example 2 Consider a utilitarian relation called the catching up relation: For
all x; y 2 X
x %C y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,Pn
i=1 xi ¸
Pn
i=1 yi.
Let x = (1; 0; 1; 0; : : : ) and y = (0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ). Then we have x ÂC y, contra-
dicting x » y implied by Q-Anonymity.
4 Possibility
In this section, we consider the compatibility of Q-Anonymity and Weak Pref-
erence Continuity.
4.1 Overtaking criterion
For all n 2 N, let %n» a re°exive, complete and transitive binary relation (an
ordering) on Rn satisfying the following three properties: For all x¡n; y¡n 2 Rn
(®) If x¡n > y¡n, then x¡n Ân» y¡n
(¯) If (x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(n)) = (y
¡n
(1) ; : : : ; y
¡n
(n)), then x
¡n »n» y¡n
(°) For all ± 2 R, (x¡n; ±) %n+1» (y¡n; ±) if and only if x¡n %n» y¡n.
Using %n» , we can de¯ne an overtaking criterion on X as follows: For all
x; y 2 X
x Â» y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,
x¡n Ân» y¡n and
x »» y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,
x¡n »n» y¡n.
We now need to show that %» is a SWR. This is proved in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 %» is a SWR.
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Proof Re°exivity of %» follows from the fact that %n» is re°exive. To check
transitivity, let x %» y and y %» z. By de¯nition, there exist ¹n; ¹n0 2 N such
that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, either x¡n Ân» y¡n or x¡n »n» y¡n, and for all
integers n0 ¸ ¹n0, either y¡n0 Ân0» z¡n
0
or y¡n
0 »n0» z¡n
0
. Let ¹N = maxf¹n; ¹n0g.
Then by de¯nition, we distinguish the four cases which cover all possiblties: For
all integers N ¸ ¹N , (a) x¡N ÂN» y¡N and y¡N ÂN» z¡N , (b) x¡N ÂN» y¡N
and y¡N »N» z¡N , (c) x¡N »N» y¡N and y¡N ÂN» z¡N and (d) x¡N »N» y¡N
and y¡N »N» z¡N . Transitivity of %N» implies that for all integers N ¸ ¹N ,
either x¡N ÂN» z¡N or x¡N »N» z¡N . From the de¯nition of %», we obtain
x %» z.
Moreover, %» satis¯es the following two axioms.
Finite Anonymity For all x 2 X and all ¼ 2 F , ¼^(x) » x.
Weak preference continuity For all x; y 2 X, if there exists ¹n 2 N such that
for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; y+n) Â y, then x Â y.
Lemma 2 %» satis¯es Finite Anonymity.
Proof Let x 2 X and ¼ 2 F . By de¯nition, there exists ¹n 2 N such that
(¼^(x))+¹n = x+¹n. By the property (¯), for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (¼^(x))¡n »n» x¡n.
From the de¯nition of %», we obtain ¼^(x) »» x.
Lemma 3 %» satis¯es Weak Preference Continuity.
Proof Assume that there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; y+n)
Â» y. By de¯nition, there exists ¹n0 2 N such that for all integers n0 ¸ ¹n0(
(a) x¡n
0 Ân0» y¡n
0
if n0 · n
(b) (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; yn0) Ân0» y¡n
0
otherwise.
In the case (b), since %n0» satis¯es the property (°), we have x¡n Ân» y¡n. Hence
in both cases, from the de¯nition of Â», we obtain x Â» y.
Using the SWR %», we can de¯ne an extension of %» as follows:2 For all
x; y 2 X
x ÂQ» y holds if and only if there exist ¼; ½ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) Â» ½^(y) and
x »Q» y holds if and only if there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) »» y.3
We now need to show that %Q» is a SWR. This is proved in Lemma 4.
2Banerjee (2006) de¯ned extensions of the Suppes-Sen grading principle and the Basu-
Mitra utilitarian relation as follows: For all x; y 2 X
x %Q³ y holds if and only if there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) %³ y
where %³ denotes the Suppes-Sen grading principle or the Basu-Mitra utilitarian relation.
3Re°exivity of %» implies Q-Anonymity of %Q».
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Lemma 4 %Q» is a SWR.
We ¯rst prove the following two lemmas which are used to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 %Q» satis¯es quasi-transitivity, that is, for all x; y; z 2 X, if x ÂQ» y
and y ÂQ» z, then x ÂQ» z.
Proof Assume that x ÂQ» y and y ÂQ» z. By de¯nition, there exist ¼; ½; ¾; ¿ 2
Q such that ¼^(x) Â» ½^(y) and ¾^(y) Â» ¿^(z). Since ¼; ½; ¾; ¿ 2 Q, there
exist p; r; s; t 2 N such that for all n 2 N, ¼(f1; : : : ; npg) = f1; : : : ; npg,
½(f1; : : : ; nrg) = f1; : : : ; nrg, ¾(f1; : : : ; nsg) = f1; : : : ; nsg and ¿(f1; : : : ; ntg) =
f1; : : : ; ntg. Now, since ¼^(x) Â» ½^(y) and ¾^(y) Â» ¿^(z), there exist ¹`; ¹m 2 N such
that ¹`= np = n0q; ¹m = n00r = n000s, for all integers ` ¸ ¹`, (¼^(x))¡` Â`» (½^(y))¡`
and for all integers m ¸ ¹m, (¾^(y))¡m Âm» (¿^(z))¡m. Let ¹N be a common mul-
tiple of ¹` and ¹m. Then for all integers N ¸ ¹N , (¼^(x))¡N ÂN» (½^(y))¡N and
(¾^(y))¡N ÂN» (¿^(z))¡N . It follows from the choice of ¹N and the property (¯)
of %nN» that for all n 2 N, (¼^(x))¡n ¹N Ân ¹N» (½^(y))¡n ¹N »n ¹N» (¾^(y))¡n ¹N Ân ¹N»
(¿^(z))¡n ¹N . Transitivity of %n ¹N» implies that for all n 2 N, (¼^(x))¡n ¹N Ân ¹N»
(¿^(z))¡n ¹N . We show that there exist ¼0; ¿ 0 2 Q such that for all integers N ¸ ¹N ,
(¼^0(x))¡N ÂN» (¿^ 0(z))¡N , that is, ¼^0(x) Â» ¿^ 0(z). We can construct ¼0 and ¿ 0
as follows: If for all integers N ¸ ¹N , (¼^(x))¡N ÂN» (¿^(z))¡N , we are done. So
assume that there exists i 2 fn ¹N+1; : : : ; (n+1) ¹N¡1g such that :((¼^(x))¡i Âi»
(¿^(z))¡i) and (by the properties (®) and (°) of %i») (¼^(x))i < (¿^(z))i. Then
there must exist j 2 fi+1; : : : ; (n+1) ¹Ng such that (¼^(x))¡j Âj» (¿^(z))¡j and (by
the properties (®) and (°) of %j») (¼^(x))j > (¿^(z))j since (¼^(x))¡(n+1)
¹N Â(n+1) ¹N»
(¿^(z))¡(n+1) ¹N . Let À1 2 F ½ Q be a permutation such that À^21(ei) = À^1(ej) = ei
and for all k 2 N n fi; jg, À^1(ek) = ek. Then (by using the same argument re-
peatedly if necessary) there exists a positive integer k · ¹N such that for all
integers N ¸ ¹N , (À^k(: : : (À^1(¼^(x)))))¡N ÂN» (À^k(: : : (À^1(¿^(z)))))¡N . Using the
fact that Àk ± ¢ ¢ ¢ ± À1 ± ¼; Àk ± ¢ ¢ ¢ ± À1 ± ¿ 2 Q, from the de¯nition of %Q», we
obtain x ÂQ» z.
Lemma 6 For all x; y 2 X, x »» y if and only if for all ¼ 2 Q, ¼^(x) »» ¼^(y).
Proof (only if part) Assume x »» y. Since ¼ 2 Q, there exists k 2 N such
that for all n 2 N, ¼(f1; : : : ; nkg) = f1; : : : ; nkg. Now, since x »» y, there
exists ¹N 2 N such that ¹N = nk and for all integers N ¸ ¹N , x¡N »N» y¡N .
Since %N» satis¯es the property (°), we have x+
¹N = y+ ¹N . It follows from
the choice of ¹N and the property (¯) of % ¹N» that (¼^(x))¡
¹N » ¹N» (¼^(y))¡ ¹N and
(¼^(x))+ ¹N = (¼^(y))+ ¹N . Since %N» satis¯es the property (°), for all integers N ¸
¹N , (¼^(x))¡N »N» (¼^(y))¡N . From the de¯nition of %», we obtain ¼^(x) »» ¼^(y).
(if part) Assume ¼^(x) »» ¼^(y). Using the fact that ¼¡1 2 Q and the \only
if" part of the lemma, we obtain x »» y.
Proof of Lemma 4 Re°exivity of %Q» follows from the fact that ¶ 2 Q and %»
is re°exive. To check transitivity, we consider the following four cases which
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cover all possibilities: (a) x ÂQ» y and y ÂQ» z, (b) x ÂQ» y and y »Q» z, (c)
x »Q» y and y ÂQ» z and (d) x »Q» y and y »Q» z.
(a) x ÂQ» y and y ÂQ» z: In this case, by Lemma 5, we obtain x ÂQ» z.
(b) x ÂQ» y and y »Q» z: In this case, by de¯nition, there exist ¼; ½; ¾ 2 Q
such that ¼^(x) Â» ½^(y) and ¾^(y) »» z. Using Lemma 6 and the fact that
¾¡1 2 Q, we have y »» ¾^¡1(z). Again, using Lemma 6 and the fact that
½ ± ¾¡1 2 Q, we have x Â» ½^(y) »» ½^(¾^¡1(z)). Transitivity of %» implies
x Â» ½^(¾^¡1(z)). From the de¯nition of %Q», we obtain x ÂQ» z.
(c) x »Q» y and y ÂQ» z: In this case, by de¯nition, there exist ¼; ½; ¾ 2 Q
such that ¼^(x) »» y and ½^(y) Â» ¾^(z). Using Lemma 6 and the fact that ¼ ±½ 2
Q, we have ¼^(½^(x)) »» ½^(y) Â» ¾^(z). Transitivity of %» implies ¼^(½^(x)) Â» ¾^(z).
From the de¯nition of %Q», we obtain x ÂQ» z.
(d) x »Q» y and y »Q» z: In this case, by de¯nition, there exist ¼; ½ 2 Q
such that ¼^(x) »» y and ½^(y) »» z. Using Lemma 6 and the fact that ¼ ±½ 2 Q,
we have ¼^(½^(x)) »» ½^(y) »» z. Transitivity of %» implies ¼^(½^(x)) »» z. From
the de¯nition of %Q», we obtain x »Q» z.
Theorem 1 If a SWR % satis¯es Q-Anonymity and all the axioms that char-
acterizes %», then %Q» is a subrelation to %.
Proof Assume that a SWR % satis¯es Q-Anonymity and all the axioms that
characterizes %». To prove that %Q» is a subrelation to %, we have to establish
(a) x ÂQ» y ) x Â y and (b) x »Q» y ) x » y. Recall that the inverse of P in
Q is denoted by ¼¡1.
(a) Let x ÂQ» y. By de¯nition, there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) Â» y.
Since %» is a subrelation to %, ¼^(x) Â y. Since % satis¯es Q-Anonymity,
x = ¼^¡1(¼^(x)) » ¼^(x) Â y and by transitivity, x Â y.
(b) Let x »Q» y. By de¯nition, there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) »» y.
Since %» is a subrelation to %, ¼^(x) » y. Since % satis¯es Q-Anonymity,
x = ¼^¡1(¼^(x)) » ¼^(x) » y and by transitivity, x » y.
4.2 Two versions of the overtaking criteria
Following Asheim and Tungodden (2004), de¯ne the following two SWRs. Using
%nL, we ¯rst de¯ne a leximin relation called the W-leximin relation: For all
x; y 2 X
x ÂLw y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,
x¡n ÂnL y¡n, and
x »Lw y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,
(x¡n(1) ; : : : ; x
¡n
(n)) = (y
¡n
(1) ; : : : ; y
¡n
(n)).
Hammond equity For all x; y 2 X and all i; j 2 N, if yi < xi < xj < yj and
for all k 2 N n fi; jg, xk = yk, then x % y.
Proposition 3 (Asheim and Tungodden (2004), Proposition 2) A SWR
% satis¯es Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, Weak Preference Continuity and
Hammond Equity if and only if %Lw is a subrelation to %.
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Using the SWR %Lw, we can de¯ne an extension of the W-leximin relation
as follows: For all x; y 2 X
x ÂQLw y holds if and only if there exist ¼; ½ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) ÂLw ½^(y) and
x »QLw y holds if and only if there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) »Lw y.
Theorem 2 A SWR % satis¯es Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, Weak Preference
Continuity and Hammond Equity if and only if %QLw is a subrelation to %.
Proof (only if part) By Theorem 1, a SWR % satis¯es the four axioms of the
theorem statement only if %QLw is a subrelation to %.
(if part) Assume that %QLw is a subrelation to %.
(Strong Pareto) Suppose that x; y 2 X are such that x > y. Since %Lw
satis¯es Strong Pareto, x ÂLw y. From the de¯nition of ÂQLw, we have x ÂQLw
y. Since %QLw is a subrelation to %, we obtain x Â y.
(Q-Anonymity) Let ¼ 2 Q. By de¯nition, ¼¡1; ¼¡1 ± ¼ 2 Q. Since %Lw is
re°exive, ¼^¡1(¼^(x)) = x »Lw x. By de¯nition, ¼^(x) »QLw x. Since %QLw is a
subrelation to %, we obtain ¼^(x) » x.
(Weak Preference Continuity) Suppose that x; y 2 X are such that there
exists ¹n 2 N with for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; y+n) Â y. Since %QLw is
a subrelation to %, %Lw is a subrelation to %QLw, and %Lw is complete for
comparisons between (x¡n; y+n) and y, this implies that there exists ¹n 2 N
such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, (x¡n; y+n) ÂLw y. By de¯nition, this entails
that x ÂLw y, which in turn implies x Â y since %Lw is a subrelation to %QLw
and %QLw is a subrelation to %. Thus, we have established that Â satis¯es
Weak Preference Continuity.
(Hammond Equity) Suppose that x; y 2 X and i; j 2 N are such that yi <
xi < xj < yj and for all k 2 N n fi; jg, xk = yk. Let I = maxfi; jg. Then for all
integers n ¸ I, x¡n %nLw y¡n. By de¯nition, we have x %Lw y and since %Lw
is a subrelation to %QLw and %QLw is a subrelation to %, x % y.
Following Banerjee (2006), we can strengthen the conclusion of Theorem 2
further. We denote the set of all SWRs satisfying Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity,
Weak Preference Continuity and Hammond Equity by ¥ and consider the fol-
lowing binary relation on X: For all x; y 2 X
x %¤ y holds if and only if for all %2 ¥, x % y.
We can now prove
Theorem 3 %¤ is a SWR satisfying Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, Weak Pref-
erence Continuity and Hammond Equity. Moreover, %¤´%QLw.
The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity.
Next, we de¯ne a utilitarian relation called the overtaking relation: For all
x; y 2 X
x ÂO y holds if and only if there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers n ¸ ¹n,Pn
i=1 xi >
Pn
i=1 yi and
x »O y holds if and only if there exists n 2 N such that
Pn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 yi.
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2-Generation unit comparability For all x; y; z 2 X and all i; j 2 N, if
x % y and for all k 2 N n fi; jg, zk = 0, then (x+ z) % (y + z).
Proposition 4 (Asheim and Tungodden (2004), Proposition 5) A SWR
% satis¯es Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, Weak Preference Continuity and
2-Generation Unit Comparability if and only if %QO is a subrelation to %.
Using the SWR %O, we can de¯ne an extension of the overtaking relation
as follows: For all x; y 2 X
x ÂQO y holds if and only if there exist ¼; ½ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) ÂO ½^(y) and
x »QO y holds if and only if there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) »O y.
Theorem 4 A SWR % satis¯es Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, Weak Prefer-
ence Continuity and 2-Generation Unit Comparability if and only if %QO is a
subrelation to %.
Proof (only if part) By Theorem 1, a SWR % satis¯es the four axioms of the
theorem statement only if %QO is a subrelation to %.
(if part) Assume that %QO is a subrelation to %. Arguments similar to those
used in the only-if part of the proof of Theorem 2 establish that% satis¯es Strong
Pareto, Q-Anonymity and Weak Preference Continuity.
(2-Generation Unit Comparability) Suppose that x; y; z 2 X and j; k 2 N
are such that x % y, for all i 2 N n fj; kg, zi = 0. Since %QO is a subrelation
to % and %O is a subrelation to %QO, this implies that there exists ¹n 2 N such
that for all integers n ¸ ¹n, either Pni=1 xi > Pni=1 yi or Pni=1 xi = Pni=1 yi.
By de¯nition, this entails that there exists ¹n 2 N such that for all integers
n ¸ ¹n, either Pni=1(xi + zi) >Pni=1(yi + zi) or Pni=1(xi + zi) =Pni=1(yi + zi),
which in turn implies x % y since %O is a subrelation to %QO and %QO is a
subrelation to %. Thus, we have established that % satis¯es 2-Generation Unit
Comparability.
Again following Banerjee (2006), the characterization result can be strength-
ened further. Let ¥0 denote the set of all SWRs satisfying Strong Pareto, Q-
Anonymity, Weak Preference Continuity and 2-Generation Unit Comparability
and consider the following binary relation on X: For all x; y 2 X
x %0 y holds if and only if for all %2 ¥0, x % y.
Theorem 5 %0 is a SWR satisfying Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, Weak Pref-
erence Continuity and 2-Generation Unit Comparability. Moreover, %0´%QO.
The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity.
5 Comparison with the overtaking andQ-simpli¯ed
criteria
In this section, we compare the rankings by the Q-overtaking criteria with those
by the overtaking criteria and the Q-simpli¯ed criteria. We will consider a class
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of examples for which it is argued that the rankings by the Q-overtaking criteria
are more complete than those by the overtaking criteria and the Q-simpli¯ed
criteria. Throughout this section, let ¼ be the permutation de¯ned as follows:
¼(n) =
(
n+ 1 if n is odd
n¡ 1 otherwise.
It is easy to check that for all n 2 N, ¼(f1; : : : ; 2ng) = f1; : : : ; 2ng. This shows
that ¼ 2 Q.
We ¯rst provide a class of examples to illustrate the relative merits of the
Q-overtaking relation.
Example 3 Consider the following two utility streams x and y:
x = (1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; : : : )
y = (0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ):
(1)
We will compare the ranking of x and y made by the Q-overtaking relation with
that by the overtaking relation. Note that in the pair de¯ned in (1), for all odd
numbers n,
Pn
i=1 xi >
Pn
i=1 yi and for all even numbers n,
Pn
i=1 xi =
Pn
i=1 yi.
By de¯nition, the overtaking relation declares x and y as non-comparable and
using the de¯nition of the catching up relation, we get x ÂC y. Now, ¼^(x) = y
and hence, ¼^(x) »O y. By de¯nition, x »QO y.
Example 4 Consider the following two utility streams x and y:
x = ( 12 ; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; : : : )
y = (0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ):
(2)
We will compare the ranking of x and y made by the Q-overtaking relation with
that by the overtaking relation. Note that in the pair de¯ned in (2), for all odd
numbers n,
Pn
i=1 xi >
Pn
i=1 yi and for all even numbers n,
Pn
i=1 xi <
Pn
i=1 yi.
By de¯nition, the catching up relation declares x and y as non-comparable.
Now, ¼^(y) > x and hence, ¼^(y) ÂO x. By de¯nition, y ÂQO x.
Next, we introduce two versions of the simpli¯ed criterion: The Basu-Mitra
utilitarian relation and the leximin relation characterized by Bossert et al.
(2007).
The Basu-Mitra utilitarian relation is de¯ned as follows: For all x; y 2 X
x %U y holds if and only if there exists n 2 N such that
(
Pn
i=1 xi; x
+n) > (
Pn
i=1 yi; y
+n).
Using the SWR %U , we can de¯ne the Q-utilitarian relation characterized
by Banerjee (2006) as follows:4 For all x; y 2 X
x %QU y holds if and only if there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) %U y.
4An alternative characterization of this extended SWR was provided in Kamaga and Ko-
jima (2007).
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Next, using %nL, we de¯ne the leximin relation characterized by Bossert et
al. (2007) as follows: For all x; y 2 X
x %L y holds if and only if there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nL y¡n and
x+n > y+n.
Using the SWR %L, we can de¯ne an extension of the leximin relation as
follows:5 For all x; y 2 X
x %QL y holds if and only if there exists ¼ 2 Q such that ¼^(x) %L y.
We now consider an example to illustrate the relative merits of the Q-
overtaking relation.
Example 5 (Banerjee (2006), Example 3) Consider the following two utility
streams x and y:
x = (1; 12 ;
1
2 ;
1
23 ;
1
23 ;
1
25 ; : : : )
y = (1; 1; 122 ;
1
22 ;
1
24 ;
1
24 ; : : : ):
As Banerjee (2006) discussed, the Q-utilitarian relation declares x and y to be
non-comparable. However, since for all integers n ¸ 2, Pni=1 yi > Pni=1 xi, we
have y ÂO x which is compatible with Banerjee (2006)'s observation. Since %O
is subrelation to %QO, we also have y ÂQO x.
Moreover, as Banerjee (2006) showed, it is impossible to achieve Pareto
dominance after some ¯nite generation with in¯nite permutation matrices in the
class Q. So the Q-leximin relation also declares x and y to be non-comparable.
However, y ÂLw ¼^(x). By de¯nition, y ÂQLw x.6
Example 6 Consider the following two utility streams x and y:
x = (1; 1; 13 ;
1
3 ;
1
9 ;
1
9 ;
1
27 ; : : : )
y = (1; 23 ;
2
3 ;
2
9 ;
2
9 ;
2
27 ;
2
27 ; : : : ):
One can generate the utility stream x in the following way: x1 = 1 and for all
integers n ¸ 2
xn =
(
3p
3
n if n is evenp
3p
3
n otherwise.
Similarly, y1 = 1 and for all integers n ¸ 2
yn =
(
2p
3
n if n is even
2
p
3p
3
n otherwise.
Clearly, x and y are non-comparable according to the W-leximin relation, since
for all even numbers n, minfx1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; yng = yn and for all odd numbers
5This extended SWR was characterized in Kamaga and Kojima (2007).
6Note that there exists no ½ 2 Q satisfying ½^(y) ÂLw x in this example.
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n, minfx1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; yng = xn. Moreover, x and y are non-comparable
according to the overtaking relation, since for all even numbers n,
Pn
i xi >Pn
i yi and for all odd numbers n,
Pn
i xi =
Pn
i yi. However, x ÂO ¼^(y) and
¼^(y) ÂLw x. By de¯nition, x ÂQO y and y ÂQLw x.7
We now discuss a potential drawback of two versions of the Q-overtaking cri-
teria. Example 7 presents an example in which two versions of the Q-overtaking
criteria fail to compare them.
Example 7 (Lauwers (1997, p. 230)) Consider the following two utility streams
x and y:
x = (
1z}|{
1
2 ;
2z}|{
0; 0 ;
3z }| {
0; 0; 1;
4z }| {
0; 0; 0; 0;
5z }| {
0; 0; 0; 0; 1;
6z }| {
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; : : : )
y = ( 0|{z}
1
; 0; 1|{z}
2
; 0; 0; 0| {z }
3
; 0; 0; 0; 1| {z }
4
; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0| {z }
5
; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1| {z }
6
; 0; 0; 0; : : : ):
One can generate the utility stream x in the following way: x1 = 12 and for all
integers n ¸ 2
xn =
(
1 if n = k(2k ¡ 1) for some k 2 N
0 otherwise.
Similarly
yn =
(
1 if n = k(2k + 1) for some k 2 N
0 otherwise.
There exist no ¼; ½ 2 Q satisfying ¼^(x) %» ½^(y) or ¼^(y) %» ½^(x), since for all n 2
N, x¡n(2n¡1) Ân(2n¡1)» y¡n(2n¡1), y¡n(2n+1) Ân(2n+1)» x¡n(2n+1), x¡(n+1)(2n¡1) Â(n+1)(2n¡1)»
y¡(n+1)(2n¡1) and so forth, where %» denotes the W-leximin or overtaking re-
lation. Consequently, x and y are non-comparable according to two versions of
the Q-overtaking criteria. Note that in order to extend two versions of the Q-
overtaking criteria to complete orderings, one has to judge such types of utility
streams.
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